The disappearance of money from DMB customers’ accounts – Tribune Online

IN the architecture of banking, trust is the cornerstone upon which every transaction rests. Customers surrender their hard-earned funds to banks not merely as deposits but as acts of confidence. There is strong expectation that the institutions entrusted with the funds possess both integrity and the technological competence to protect them. When that trust is betrayed, the damage transcends individual loss; it strikes at the heart of the financial system itself. Sadly, cases of unauthorised withdrawals from bank accounts have peaked. According to reports, the value of losses in the first quarter of 2025 alone reached N3.3 billion. In this connection, the recent unauthorised withdrawal of ₦9.98 million from the account of a university professor has once again exposed the troubling vulnerabilities within the banking sector. The matter, now the subject of a formal petition to the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN), raises crucial questions about institutional responsibility, cybersecurity integrity, and the disturbing culture of denial that often follows incidents of financial fraud.

The details are unsettling. A depositor operating within the framework of Nigeria’s regulatory identity systems saw nearly N10 million disappear from his account through transactions he said he did not authorise. Instead of initiating a vigorous, transparent investigation, the bank’s response reportedly followed a pattern that has become all too familiar: subtle insinuations of customer negligence, bureaucratic deflection, and a conspicuous reluctance to pursue the perpetrators with the seriousness the matter demands. The response to the initial complaint indicated that the funds had been utilised to purchase cryptocurrency. But such response insults not only the victim but the intelligence of the Nigerian public. The defence based on the use of login credentials and Personal Identification Number (PIN) does not absolve any bank in the event of fraud. Banks must implement multi-layered fraud detection systems, including behavioural analytics and transaction monitoring.

As there is no publicly available empirical evidence to support the sweeping claim that most victims are careless, what is obvious is that the bank has been negligent. If Nigeria has invested enormous resources in identity verification systems such as the National Identification Number (NIN) and the Bank Verification Number (BVN), what precisely is their operational value if banks cannot trace suspicious transactions to their beneficiaries? Why enforce elaborate Know-Your-Customer (KYC)protocols if, when fraud occurs, the institutions that demanded those details suddenly claim helplessness? The contradiction is glaring. Banks insist on biometric verification, layered authentication, and regulatory documentation before opening accounts. Yet when funds vanish into other accounts, sometimes within the same banking ecosystem, the trail becomes mysteriously opaque. Such explanations strain credibility.

Banks, by their nature, are custodians of public trust.  This responsibility is underscored by the CBN’s KYC guidelines. If funds can be traced to beneficiary accounts, then they should not be impossible to recover. That is why agencies such as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) exist. But even more disturbing is the growing suspicion that some of these breaches may not be entirely external. Cybercriminals certainly exist, but internal compromise, whether through collusion, negligence or systemic loopholes, is often the variable quietly buried beneath layers of institutional defensiveness. Without transparent investigations and collaboration with law enforcement, this malaise remains unaddressed while customers are left to carry the burden of proof. This raises serious questions about DMB’s internal controls, cybersecurity resilience, and investigative rigour.

Patterns of negligence and ineptitude have been seen in many previous legal actions. In September, 2025, a Lagos High Court ordered a DMB to pay ₦5 million in damages to a customer for misconduct involving conflicting statements and breach of duty. In another, the FCT High Court awarded ₦5 million to an electronic financing company in 2025. In these examples and others, courts consistently found the DMB liable for infractions. This is worrisome.  If funds can be traced to beneficiary accounts, then accountability should not evaporate in a haze of procedural excuses. In credible financial systems, such as that of the United States or the United Kingdom, unauthorised transactions are treated with urgency and seriousness. Once a customer reports fraud, banks initiate investigations promptly, and funds are reversed very quickly.

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This approach reflects a fundamental principle: the burden of system security lies primarily with the institution, not the individual depositor. Nigeria’s approach is, sadly, the exact opposite. The CBN issues commendable guidelines on consumer protection and has, at times, directed banks to refund victims of fraudulent withdrawals. But these interventions are often reactive, not systemic. Grand pronouncements are made, but consistent enforcement remains elusive, leaving customers cheated and robbed of their funds. This is why the petition before the CBN deserves urgent and decisive attention. The regulatory authority cannot afford to treat the current case as yet another isolated customer complaint. The issue speaks to a broader pattern that has repeatedly surfaced in public discourse. No bank should be insulated from scrutiny when depositors’ funds vanish under questionable circumstances.

In today’s financial world, cybersecurity is not optional. Across the globe, corporations invest billions annually to fortify digital infrastructure precisely because breaches can occur at the speed of light. For financial institutions, whose very existence depends on safeguarding public funds, the obligation is even higher. To suggest, therefore, that customers must bear primary responsibility for protecting systems designed, managed, and secured by banks is logically flawed. Victims of unauthorised debits deserve something far more meaningful than polite acknowledgements and procedural delays. They deserve reimbursement. They deserve an apology. The CBN must now step forward with clarity and firmness.